National Assembly Research Service Says Two Large Wildfires Are an “Illusion”… 367 Wildfires in 2026, Damaged Area Six Times That of 2024

In March 2025, South Korea experienced the worst wildfire in its history. There were 31 deaths, property damage of 1.0974 trillion won, wildfire-damaged area of 104,000 ha, and the wildfire impact zone(based on fire-line boundaries) reached 48,239 ha (National Assembly Research Service). One year later, the government says it has “changed.” As of the end of May 2026, only two large wildfires of 100 ha or more had occurred. At the ‘Report and Debate on the Publication of a Follow-up Measures Report One Year After the Large Wildfires in the Yeongnam Region’ held on the 2nd under the theme ‘One Year After the Large Wildfires in the Yeongnam Region, What Has Changed and What Must Be Changed?’ based on a report it published on the 18th of last month, the National Assembly Research Service called for taking another look first at this number of ‘two cases.’

The illusion of “two cases”…Compared with 2024, wildfires increased by 88 cases, and damaged area grew six-fold
The report’s first point concerns the basis of comparison. The government evaluates the two large wildfires in 2026 as an achievement of its comprehensive wildfire measures, but the Research Service viewed this as “an illusion resulting from a simple comparison with 2025, when damage was exceptionally severe.”

The picture changes when compared with 2024, which was at an average-year level. The number of wildfires rose from 279 to 367, and the damaged area increased about six-fold from 123.27 ha to 727.58 ha. Damaged area per fire also grew from 0.44 ha to 1.98 ha. In light of statistics showing that over the past 20 years, there were 10 years—half the period—in which there was one or fewer large wildfires of 100 ha or more in a year, and 13 years (65%) with two or fewer, the report assessed that two cases in a year of all-out response was “no different from an ordinary year, or rather, not a small number.”

Weather conditions were also different. The national average temperature from March 21 to 26, 2025 was 14.2℃, 7.1℃ higher than normal and the highest since observations began, an exceptional case in which a lack of precipitation·low humidity·and strong winds occurred simultaneously. By contrast, precipitation in spring 2026 (268.1 mm) and the number of rainy days(24.6 days) were both at average levels. The report emphasized that “evaluations must move away from complacency based on short-term weather conditions or temporary statistical decreases.”

Command system, stages were reduced but the ‘initial gap’ remains
The sharpest issue is the command system. The government reduced the wildfire response stages from ‘initial+three spread stages’ to ‘initial+two spread stages’ and, in ‘January 2026,’ changed the system so that the head of the Korea Forest Service would command regardless of the scale of a wildfire. The aerial firefighting unit increased from 104 to 200 personnel, the special firefighting unit from 435 to 555, and 76 multipurpose wildfire-fighting vehicles were newly introduced. In March, a national wildfire response situation team involving the Ministry of the Interior and Safety·the National Fire Agency·the National Police Agency·and the Korea Meteorological Administration was also newly established.

Even so, the report’s assessment is cold. “The ambiguous precondition of ‘when there is concern about a catastrophic large wildfire’ undermines the effectiveness of the guidelines,” it says. Wildfires start from small embers and become large, and the report points out that saying the Korea Forest Service will step in only when there is already concern that a fire will grow leaves a structural gap in the control tower at the initial suppression stage. Basic local governments responsible for the initial and Stage 1 response are currently responding with one or two small-to-medium leased helicopters and specialized wildfire prevention and suppression crews mainly composed of people in their 60s and older.

Regarding the launch of the Forest Disaster Response Corps(9,272 people) as well, the report assessed that it is difficult to view it as strengthening expertise, saying it “is merely an integration to operate year-round the spring specialized wildfire prevention and suppression crews, the summer landslide field prevention teams, and the fall pest monitoring and control teams.” As future tasks, it proposed proactive command from the small-wildfire stage and redesigning response stages based not on ‘damaged area’ but on ‘mobilized resources·on-site demand.’ 

Experts’ views are divided. Lee Young-joo, professor in the Department of Fire and Disaster Prevention at Kyungil University, countered that “proactive command by the Korea Forest Service starting with small wildfires is not realistic” and that “it is preferable for local governments to lead responses to small and medium wildfires while the Korea Forest Service provides support.” Instead, he called for systematizing and mandating command-capacity training for the Korea Forest Service leadership. “Joint drills such as Safe Korea Training have limits if they are held only about once a year,” he said.

Won Myung-soo, head of the Wildfire Research Division at the National Institute of Forest Science, argued in the opposite direction for strengthening the Korea Forest Service. He proposed that “the Korea Forest Service’s authority to mobilize resources should be strengthened beyond the level of cooperation to the level of actual orders, and a Korea Forest Service-led ‘interministerial cooperation-type’ disaster management model should be established.” He also proposed accelerating the establishment of a National Forest Disaster Education and Training Center and introducing helicopters capable of nighttime suppression.

Resident evacuation, the law exists but disparities among local governments remain
There has been clear institutional progress in the field of resident evacuation. Article 9-2 of the Forest Disaster Prevention Act was newly established(promulgated May 12, 2026, effective November 13), making it mandatory for local governments in forest disaster risk areas to establish resident evacuation plans. Through measures to improve the resident evacuation system for ultra-fast wildfires, the government applied maximum instantaneous wind speed instead of average wind speed and established quantitative criteria based on the wildfire spread speed in the North Gyeongsang case of 8.2 km/h (maximum instantaneous wind speed 27.6 m/s), classifying areas within 5 hours as requiring immediate execution and areas within 8 hours as requiring preparation for execution.

The problem is the field. When the report compared resident evacuation plans in Ulsan·North Gyeongsang·and South Gyeongsang, Yeongyang County in North Gyeongsang included the status of designated shelters·wildfire-vulnerable facilities·village patrol units·lists of priority evacuees·and evacuation plans for social welfare facilities, whereas South Gyeongsang Province and Sancheong County had only specified duties by department to some extent.

Education and training performance also varies widely. From January to April 2026, the number of public officials who completed wildfire training was 10,562, up 16.8% from the same period the previous year, but Yeongdeok County(231.9 billion won) and Uiseong County(209.6 billion won) in North Gyeongsang, which ranked third and fourth in damage, did not conduct their own public-official training even after the wildfires. Yeongyang County and Yeongdeok County were also found not to have conducted mock drills for residents.

Jeong Min-soo, a researcher at the National Disaster Management Research Institute, identified structural causes of evacuation failures through empirical data. In the 2025 survey on the status of recovery levels from disaster damage, 41.6% of victims did not know in advance that they could be affected by a disaster, and 65.1% were unable to take separate preparedness actions. As for reasons they could not evacuate, 57.7% cited “a situation in which they could not prepare to evacuate on their own.”

Researcher Jeong particularly pointed out the limits of current guidelines that place responsibility on operators of vulnerable facilities such as nursing hospitals to secure private ambulances, and proposed introducing a ‘wide-area evacuation mobility control tower’ in which local government disaster situation rooms centrally control transportation resources inside and outside their jurisdictions. He also called for legislation of a standard unit-price table for disaster transport costs and a fast track for pre(advance) support·post(later) settlement to prevent on-site confusion over private transport costs.

Forest-road density 4.3 m/ha·fire-resistant forests 1,540 ha over four years…budgets failed to keep up with policy
The report assessed prevention-related policies and budgets as ‘having insufficient performance.’

The project to create fire-resistant forests that can withstand wildfires amounted to only 1,540 ha over the four years from 2021 to 2024. The national budget for 2026 is 3.7 billion won (target of 494 ha), up 700 million won from the previous year, but the national subsidy rate remains 50%. Considering that 70% of domestic forests are privately owned, the current budget scale and subsidy-rate structure have clear limits. The forest tending budget also increased only 4% from 240 billion won to 250 billion won.

The forest-road issue is even more structural. As of the end of 2024, domestic forest-road density was 4.3 m/ha, lower not only than Japan(24.1), Germany(54), and Austria(50.5), but also the United States(9.6), and Finland(5.6). The Korea Forest Service has set achieving 5.8 m/ha by 2030 as a national task, but the report pointed out that the 2026 forest-road facility budget increased by only 2.6 billion won from the previous year, raising doubts about whether the target can be met. In particular, 759.9 km (88.7%) of the 855.9 km of wildfire-fighting forest roads are concentrated in national forests, making it difficult to raise density without expanding roads in private forests, which account for 70% of the total.

The problem of shoddy construction in forestry projects has also newly emerged. According to interim results of the Korea Forest Service’s survey on forestry project corporations announced in July, on-site inspections of 1,412 companies found that more than 900 were suspected of failing to meet registration requirements, and among them 78 companies(165 people) accused of qualification lending and dual-employment violations entered procedures for investigation referrals and administrative sanctions. The report presented as tasks strengthening requirements for establishing forestry project corporations, expanding open bidding, and introducing a construction-capability evaluation system.

Director Won supported the economic value of prevention investment with international research. Citing a study published in the international journal Science that analyzed 285 large wildfires in the western United States, he explained that in areas where forest fuel management was carried out, the probability of wildfire spread decreased by up to 20%, the occurrence of medium- and high-intensity wildfires decreased by up to 80% and that benefits of about 3.75 dollars and suppression cost savings of 5 to 6 dollars were confirmed for every 1 dollar invested in fuel management. He said, “We are now in an era in which national competitiveness depends not on how quickly fires are put out, but on how well forests are managed so that fires do not grow.”

Professor Lee added a time axis to this. He argued that “the creation of fire-resistant forests should be established as a 30- to 50-year long-term or ultra-long-term plan rather than a short-term plan, and compensation·incentives·and support measures for privately owned forest land must also be identified.” Regarding drones, he said, “their utility for prevention and observation is great, but as suppression equipment they have clear limits in flight time·and payload capacity,” calling for a cautious approach to suppression-use R&D·and equipment purchases.

Recovery execution rate of 50%, and the figure of 3%
Recovery is about halfway complete. Of total recovery resources of 1.8871 trillion won, 943.3 billion won had been executed by the end of June 2026, recording an execution rate of 50%. Recovery of private facilities has entered the final stage at 90.2%, while public facilities involving large-scale construction and administrative procedures remain at 35.4%. The special law on support for wildfire damage in North Gyeongsang·South Gyeongsang·and Ulsan was enacted in October 2025 and took effect in January 2026, and housing recovery costs were made more realistic and recovery unit prices for forest products were raised

The most painful part is health management. Among more than 33,000 cases of disaster psychological support carried out by the National Trauma Center, the share actually connected to treatment and management was only about 3% . Related research also found that only 1.7% had experienced psychological support, and 76.1% did not even know the service existed. Wildfire-affected areas often already lack medical resources, so if hospitals·pharmacies·and public health centers are damaged, a gap in medical continuity arises in which treatment and medication supplies for chronic disease patients with hypertension·diabetes·COPD and other conditions are cut off. The report proposed specifying long-term health management for disaster victims as a legal obligation and standardizing regular evaluation cycles, such as 1 month·6 months·1 year·3 years after a disaster.

Researcher Jeong called for reexamining the nature of recovery itself. In the survey, wildfire disasters showed perceived recovery rates after disaster of 42.7%·67.4%, far below the overall average(74.7%), and the proportion of people at risk of PTSD was also higher than for other disasters. Presenting a system of long-term recovery monitoring indicators based on dNBR·vegetation recovery rate(ecology), displaced residents’ resettlement rate(housing·population), card sales at the eup/myeon/dong level(economy), and resilience·PTSD(social·psychological), he proposed a Build Back Better model that continues for 3 to 5 years or longer.

Wildfire waste treatment has made partial progress through two revisions of guidelines and the proposal of an amendment to the Public Waste Resources Management Facilities Act, but forest tree debris·livestock carcasses·and workplace demolition waste are still excluded from the scope of wildfire waste. The establishment of an integrated interministerial treatment system and the regional expansion of public waste resources management facilities remain unimplemented.

Forest roads and landslides, preventive logging and cultural heritage…dilemmas that cannot be solved within silos
In its conclusion, the report summarized that “the key is establishing integrated governance at the whole-of-government level that goes beyond fragmented responses among the Korea Forest Service, the National Fire Agency, local governments, and related ministries.” This is also the point where the three discussants converge, even while presenting different solutions.

Researcher Jeong explained that need through concrete contradictions. Indiscriminate expansion of forest roads in the name of wildfire suppression can increase surface runoff and cause secondary damage in the form of landslides, and proactive removal of standing trees around facilities adjacent to forests may damage the value of cultural heritage such as traditional temples, which emphasize harmony with nature. Forest roads and landslides, preventive logging and the preservation of cultural heritage are dilemmas that cannot be solved within the silos of individual ministries.

Over the past year, the establishment of evacuation plans became mandatory, recovery costs for damaged homes were made more realistic, and a special law was created. At the same time, management and supervision of forestry project corporations·evacuation guidelines by regional type, expansion of disaster insurance coverage for forest products, an integrated wildfire waste treatment system, and making long-term health management for victims a legal obligation remain on the task list. The report requested that “in a situation where the frequency and intensity of wildfires are increasing further due to climate change, the government should promptly implement the deficiencies and future tasks identified in this review.”