[Planning] Sustainable Agricultural Machinery ODA ① Korean Agricultural Machinery ODA: When the Project Ends, the Machinery Stops Too

In South Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) for agricultural machinery, once a project ends, the post-management budget and the personnel responsible for it disappear as well. Tractors and rice transplanters that have stopped because even a single part cannot be obtained are left abandoned in warehouses. Official development assistance is supposed to serve as a bridgehead for Korean agricultural machinery to enter the recipient country’s market, but the reality is the exact opposite. Where projects have ended, what remains is not a foothold for Korean companies, but a reputation that Korean agricultural machinery cannot be repaired once it breaks down. We examine the structural problems behind why Korean agricultural machinery is being shunned and not chosen in markets linked to ODA.

Domestic agricultural machinery, has no place in 5 trillion won worth of ODA projects
ODA refers to the government’s provision of funding and technology to support the economic development and welfare improvement of developing countries. In South Korea, the Committee for International Development Cooperation under the Prime Minister’s Office oversees overall policy, while implementation is carried out through a dual system: the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handles grant aid, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance together with the Export-Import Bank of Korea handles concessional loans through the Economic Development Cooperation Fund. In the agricultural sector, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs and the Rural Development Administration separately pursue projects, with the Korea Program on International Agriculture (KOPIA), an overseas agricultural technology development program operated by the Rural Development Administration since 2009, serving as a representative example. In 2026, South Korea’s ODA project scale stands at 5.4372 trillion won, with 37 agencies carrying out 1,763 projects.

Although various projects related to ODA are being conducted in this way, agricultural machinery companies that have participated in ODA (official development assistance) projects as a breakthrough from saturation in the domestic market are facing a harsh reality. 
The head of Agricultural Machinery Company A, who said it is difficult to disclose his real name because of his history of participating in ODA projects, complained, “We tried to pioneer new sales channels through ODA projects, but locally, they are still procuring and using low-cost machinery made in other countries,” adding, “Even though these are projects into which our budget has been invested, Korean agricultural machinery is in fact being ignored.” He went on to question the effectiveness of government support, saying, “Even if we try to send Korean-made machines, customs clearance or transportation costs are not reflected in the budget.”

Despite the promising opportunity called ODA, Korean-made agricultural machinery is blocked from expanding overseas, intensifying dissatisfaction among related companies. Why is it that Korean agricultural machinery, in particular in ODA projects, is not chosen locally and continues to face difficulties?

60.2% of Cambodian farmers face cost burdens… results were achieved, but the machines stopped
According to the post-evaluation results of the “Project to Increase Agricultural Productivity through the Transfer of Farming Technology in Cambodia,” implemented by the Korea Rural Community Corporation from 2017 to 2023 with a project budget of 4.2 billion won, among the “2025 International Agricultural Cooperation (ODA) Evaluation” released by the Korea Rural Economic Institute, local farmers complained of difficulties in procuring parts for rice transplanters. In addition, in a survey conducted for about two months from November to December 2025 among 88 local farmers who received training, the most common reason for not applying the technologies (agricultural machinery) they had learned (multiple responses allowed) was “cost burden/lack of funds” at 60.2%, followed by “absence of necessary equipment/materials” at 37.5% and “unsuitable for farm conditions” at 31.8%. This question asked whether there were any items among the training content that could not be applied, and it is separate from the technology adoption rate below. The result did not occur because farmers failed to understand the training, but because after the training ended, machines and parts were out of reach.
 

Local assessments of the training results were positive. In the same survey, 90.9% of participating farmers (88 respondents) said they are currently applying the technologies (farming methods) they learned. In addition, 85.2% said they had disseminated the technologies they learned to other farmers. The problem is that the machinery needed to support those results is not running. As tractors and rice transplanters provided to the agricultural training center established through the project were not being rented out to farmers, farmers were buying used agricultural machinery at their own expense or renting it from local private companies. The report concluded that the effect of reducing production costs through agricultural machinery was limited.
 

Chinese-made 150-horsepower machines cost 80 million won, while Korean-made 100-horsepower machines cost 150 million won
From the standpoint of the purchasing power of farmers in developing countries, Korean-made agricultural machinery is criticized as being more expensive than necessary. It is provided free of charge at the support stage, but after breakdowns occur, the costs of replacing parts and performing maintenance ultimately have to be borne by farmers and recipient countries. Jeong Sang-hoon, former KOICA Senegal project manager (PM), said, “In Senegal, Chinese tractors in the 150-horsepower class cost around 80 million won, while ours in the 100-horsepower class go up to 150 million won,” adding, “From the recipient country’s perspective, expensive agricultural machinery acts as a burden.” Former PM Jeong added, “There are quite a few cases in which machines are left idle because the recipient country cannot afford maintenance costs.”

20 million to 30 million won to dispatch maintenance personnel once… the structure of the A/S vacuum
Because Korean agricultural machinery has not been distributed locally at a certain scale, domestic companies are reluctant to enter these markets, and after-sales service (A/S) centers and distribution networks are virtually nonexistent—this is the common diagnosis of people in the field. Former PM Jeong viewed the A/S vacuum not as a matter of corporate will but as a structural problem. He said, “For a distant country such as those in Africa, it costs 20 million to 30 million won, including customs clearance, to send maintenance personnel just once,” adding, “There is no company that will deliver 1 billion won worth of products and then repeat that business trip several times.”

As a solution, he proposed securing a minimum volume by bundling aid instruments. Former PM Jeong said, “A certain quantity must first be installed through grant aid, and low-interest funds must be attached through concessional loans to create scale so that service providers can enter afterward,” adding, “If companies are simply told to sell without anything on the back end, they have to shoulder all the risk.”

Even when there is local demand for Korean agricultural machinery through ODA, there are cases in which transactions themselves cannot be concluded because there is no local importer. When Lee Sang-gye, former director of the KOPIA Bolivia Center, conducted demonstrations across five departments, local farms and cooperatives expressed their intention to buy 15 potato harvesters. However, the deal could not be completed. This was because there was no intermediary import or agency company to receive the payment, remit it to the domestic manufacturer, and provide a guarantee. Former Director Lee proposed establishing a corporation to local employees, but the plan fell through because the employees had no initial capital. Former Director Lee said, “Even if farmers have money, they cannot import,” adding, “If there had been just one company to receive the payment and remit it, those 15 machines would have gone out then.” It is not because there is no purchasing power. Former Director Lee said, “In Santa Cruz Department, Bolivia, where the pilot project was carried out, it is not uncommon to find farms with more than 100 hectares of farmland and two 150-horsepower tractors.”

80–90% of local breakdowns occur due to the absence of customized specifications
Criticism is also repeatedly raised that the standard specifications of Korean agricultural machinery do not fit local farming conditions. The seed potato planter sent to Bolivia is a representative example. In South Korea, seed potatoes are cut into small pieces before planting, so the planter tray height is designed to be low. In Bolivia, by contrast, there is no cutting system, and seed potatoes are planted whole. If local seed potatoes are placed on a planter brought in with domestic specifications unchanged, they roll off the tray. The width and height of the vehicle body must be matched to local planting intervals, and tire materials must vary depending on the gravel content of the soil.

In the same potato fields in Bolivia, a vibrating harvester that digs up potatoes by vibrating the ground was unsuited to local conditions and underwent improvements. In farmland with a lot of mud, the machine could not operate, so local farmers preferred a chain type, but with the chain type, potato skins were peeled off, reducing storability. When Former Director Lee conveyed this on-site response to headquarters and the manufacturer, the company modified the machine by adding rubber to the parts that come into contact with potatoes, and in an April 2025 demonstration, the skins were hardly damaged.

Ahn Uk-hyun, director of the Export Agricultural Technology Division of the Rural Development Administration’s Technology Cooperation Bureau, said, “Before Korean agricultural machinery reaches the local site, it needs to be localized, but it is sent there without such preparations and then stops after being used a few times,” adding, “The problem is not that A/S is unavailable; fundamentally, agricultural machinery tailored to that country must be sent.” Director Ahn estimated that 80–90% of breakdowns occurring locally stem from the machinery not having customized specifications.

Director Ahn emphasized that specification adjustment is not simply a matter of lowering performance. He said, “Lowering the level of technology is a vertical concept,” adding, “In addition to that, from a horizontal perspective, the content must also change to suit that country’s environment.” His explanation is that if engine horsepower is excessive, the profitability does not work for local farmers, and engine drive systems also differ by country.

Post-management cut off when projects end
When support projects end, post-management budgets and dedicated personnel disappear together. With no entity responsible for maintenance, repairs, and parts replacement, the machinery goes down the path of being abandoned. It is the same structure as the “vacuum after results are achieved” confirmed in the Cambodia case. Former PM Jeong said, “The budget is fixed, but if a maintenance system is included as well, the tail ends up wagging the dog,” adding, “Agricultural machinery breaks down frequently by nature, so a maintenance service system is the most critical element, yet it is usually not considered or cannot be considered.” He added, “Management feasibility should be examined at the design stage, but if everything requested is included, results may appear in the short term, but in the end, it cannot be managed.”

Part ② will examine the direction South Korea’s agricultural machinery ODA should take, based on cases such as that of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).